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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 37(e)1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure received 
much attention in the lead-up to its promulgation in December 2006 
because it appeared to create a safe harbor from spoliation sanctions 
ordinarily available under Rule 37’s other provisions2 for parties that 
inadvertently lose electronic evidence.3  Proponents of the new rule 
applauded the relief it would deliver to litigants who operate sophis-
ticated electronic information systems in good faith but are held ac-
countable when those systems’ routine data-deletion functions cause 
the loss of information that may be relevant to litigation.4  The rule’s 
opponents criticized it for giving a free pass to parties who lose in-
formation to the detriment of their opponents, which in turn may 
have the residual effect of creating an incentive for litigants to 
shorten the retention period for data destined to be deleted.  Both 
the proponents and the opponents of Rule 37(e) have it wrong. 
Rule 37(e) will not, in most cases, offer any protection that the 
federal rules did not already provide.  And in those few cases where 
 ∗ J.D. 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2003, The Johns Hopkins 
University.  I wish to thank my parents, Sandu and Siona, for their love and support.  
I would also like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Howard Erichson. 
 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) was originally promulgated as Rule 37(f).  This change in 
designation came as a result of a 2007 amendment to Rule 37, and was “intended to 
be stylistic only.”  Id.  Therefore, references to Rule 37(f) in the sources cited herein 
should generally be read as references to the current Rule 37(e), unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 2 Rule 37 authorizes courts to issue sanctions for discovery abuses.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37. 
 3 See, e.g., Helen Bergman Moure, EDD Showcase: Rules and Procedures: Extreme 
Makeover, L. TECH. NEWS, Aug. 2005, at 38 (Bergman refers to the new rule as a “safe 
harbor”). 
 4 David Wilner, e-Discovery Worries?  Proposed Federal Rules on Electronic Discovery 
May Have a Broad Impact, CORP. COUNSELOR, Nov. 2004, available at https://www.lex-
isnexis.com/applieddiscovery/NewsEvents/PDFs/200411_CorpCounselor_eDiscWor
ries.pdf. 
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37(e) will deliver a novel safe harbor, it will be the result of a jurisdic-
tional idiosyncrasy rather than the rule drafters’ policy.  Two factors 
combine to reach this result.  First, the circumstances under which 
Rule 37(e) applies are narrow.  The rule requires litigants to satisfy a 
three-element foundation, but it also includes an exception that can 
override that foundation.  Second, Rule 37, as it existed prior to the 
addition of subsection (e), already included various requirements 
that, when taken in the aggregate, function similarly to the safe har-
bor that the provision purports to create. 
Nevertheless, Rule 37(e) is not entirely irrelevant.  It organizes 
the pre-existing exceptions in one rule and thus provides guidance to 
litigants and judges on how to deal with electronic information loss.5  
Further, although the rule itself does not add much to the proce-
dural law of sanctions, the fact that some litigants may believe that it 
does could result in the untoward reactions that the opponents of the 
rule feared.  For example, companies may still elect “to purge infor-
mation . . . on an accelerated basis . . . to avoid keeping what could 
hurt them in litigation.”6
Part II of this Comment introduces a framework for applying 
Rule 37(e), thereby exposing the narrow applicability of the rule.  
Each element is interpreted using a combination of committee notes, 
materials used during the rule-making process, and analogies from 
cases that have encountered similar elements.  Part III focuses on the 
different ways Rule 37 can be used to sanction information loss and 
how each method creates its own safe harbor, thus obviating the need 
for Rule 37(e).  This Part also includes a brief analysis of other 
sources of law for sanctioning spoliators and their lawyers.  Although 
Rule 37(e) only concerns sanctions that are based in Rule 37, this 
analysis is useful because it emphasizes the law’s reluctance, under al-
ternative sources of authority, to sanction parties that lose informa-
tion under the circumstances described in Rule 37(e). 
 5 See Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 
2006: Sanctions, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/ 
2006/12/5/rosenthal.html. 
 6 Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Before 
the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., 9 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/ 
0112frcp.pdf.  (statement of Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chairperson).  For a summary 
of Judge Rosenthal’s  public comments on the proposed Civil Rule Amendments 
submitted to the Committee, see Summary of Testimony and Comments on E-
discovery Amendments, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/SummaryE-Disc 
overyComments.pdf (last visited May 15, 2008). 
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II. THE NARROW APPLICATION OF RULE 37(e) 
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Advisory Committee”) 
first became aware of problems with computer-based discovery in 
1996.7  At that time, the Advisory Committee recognized that elec-
tronically stored information raised “different issues from conven-
tional discovery of paper records.”8  One such issue is quantity: large 
organizations’ computer networks have storage capacities measured 
in tetrabytes, one of which is equivalent to 500 million typewritten 
pages.9  A second issue is that computer information is dynamic, 
meaning that it can change without specific direction or knowledge.10  
For example, “turning a computer on or off can change the informa-
tion it stores.”11  A third difference is that electronically stored infor-
mation “may be incomprehensible when separated from the system 
that created it.”12  As a result of these differences, the Advisory Com-
mittee chose to amend Rule 37. 
“Rule 37[e] responds to a distinctive and necessary feature of 
computer systems—the recycling, overwriting, and alteration of elec-
tronically stored information that attends normal use.”13  Since “com-
puter systems lose, alter, or destroy information as part of routine op-
erations,” a party could be exposed to sanctions under Rule 37 more 
readily than they would with paper documents.14  Further, not only 
can these computer systems be difficult to interrupt, but it is ques-
tionable whether, in the interest of expediency, it is desirable to in-
terrupt them; the result would be an accumulation of what could be 
“duplicative and irrelevant data that must be reviewed.”15
After deliberating on these issues, which included a public 
comment period and a number of hearings, the Advisory Committee 
settled on the following language for the new rule: 
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information.  Absent 
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions un-
der these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically 
 7 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 3 (Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Ex-
cerpt_STReport_CV.pdf. 
 8 Id. at 4. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., supra note 7, at 13. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Id. 
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stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith op-
eration of an electronic information system.16
The following three step foundation for gaining the rule’s protection, 
and an exception, are imbedded in the rule: 
Step 1: The loss of information must have been due to the opera-
tion of an Electronic Information System (EIS). 
Step 2: The EIS must have been operating routinely at the time the 
information was lost. 
Step 3: The litigant responsible for the lost information must have 
been operating the EIS in good faith at the time of the loss. 
Exception: Notwithstanding the litigant’s ability to satisfy the rule’s 
foundation, under exceptional circumstances the litigant may still 
be sanctioned. 
A. Step 1: What Is an “Electronic Information System”? 
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (“Judicial Committee”) included the following examples 
of what it considers to be an EIS: 
[P]rograms that recycle storage media kept for brief periods 
against the possibility of a disaster that broadly affects computer 
operations; automatic overwriting of information that has been 
“deleted”; programs that change metadata (automatically created 
identifying information about the history or management of an 
electronic file) to reflect the latest access to particular electroni-
cally stored information; and programs that automatically discard 
information that has not been accessed within a defined period or 
that exists beyond a defined period without an affirmative effort 
to store it for a longer period.  Similarly, many database programs 
automatically create, discard, or update information without spe-
cific direction from, or awareness of, users.17
The Judicial Committee indicated that the common denominator 
among these systems is that their automatic features are essential to 
their operation; suspending or interrupting them would be either 
prohibitively expensive or burdensome.18  This characteristic makes 
these systems fundamentally different from a hard-copy document re-
tention system, which could ostensibly operate without interrupting 
an ongoing business.19
 
 16 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 17 SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE & PROC. 168 (Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ ST09-
2005.pdf#page=168 [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
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The Judicial Committee provided the following example: 
A data producer can warehouse large volumes of papers without 
affecting ongoing activities and can maintain and manage hard-
copy records separately from the creation of products or services.  
By contrast, electronic information is usually part of the data pro-
ducer’s activities, whether it be the manufacture of products or 
the provision of services.20
One example of the type of EIS to which this new rule would apply is 
a dynamic database.  These are databases that are constantly updated 
by individuals, groups of people, or automatic processes:21
For example, data feeds from point-of-sale terminals and sales-
staff reports constantly update and change a company’s sales da-
tabase with new information.  Most enterprises could not even 
contemplate preserving the vast quantity of data that would be re-
quired to determine the exact state of a dynamic database at any 
moment, days, months, or years earlier.22
The court in Bob Barker Co. v. Ferguson Safety Products, Inc.23 addressed 
dynamic databases in the context of the propriety of a document re-
quest for the production of a database and recognized the infeasibil-
ity of preserving a database which is a “dynamic collection of data that 
changes over time.”24  The court was careful to note, however, that 
documents once part of a software database that may exist at the time 
of the discovery request would be discoverable.25
More mundane electronic information systems also possess dy-
namic data characteristics.  For example, files created in a computer’s 
word processing program automatically record and update informa-
tion about that file as it is being accessed and updated.26  More gen-
erally, such metadata, or “data about data,” includes “contextual, 
processing, and use information needed to identify and certify the 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Thomas W. Burt & Gregory S. McCurdy, E-Discovery of Dynamic Data and 
Real-Time Communications: New Technology, Practical Facts, and Familiar Legal Principles, 
115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 166, 169 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/08/ 
burt_and_mccurdy.html. 
 22 Id. 
 23 No. C 04 04813 JW, 2006 WL 648674 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006).
 24 Id. at *4. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Microsoft, WD97: How to Minimize Metadata in Microsoft Word Documents, 
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/223790 (last visited May 15, 2008). 
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scope, authenticity, and integrity of active or archival electronic in-
formation or records.”27
B. Step 2: What Is “Routine”? 
The Judicial Committee indicated that the “‘routine operation 
of an [EIS]’” refers to the “ways in which such systems are generally 
designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party’s technical 
and business needs.”28  Further, the Judicial Committee indicated that 
“[s]uch features are essential to the operation of electronic informa-
tion systems.”29  This choice of language indicates that the Judicial 
Committee believes that a system’s “routine” operation is more than 
just an operation which is periodic or habitual, but rather one that 
has a purpose linked to the party’s particular “technical and business 
needs.”30  In essence, a determination of whether a system is “routine” 
should focus on how the system was operated generally, without re-
gard to the particular facts surrounding the lost information in ques-
tion. 
Document retention policies—companies’ stated policies re-
garding how long they retain data31—are precursors to electronic in-
formation systems.  When determining whether documents were 
properly destroyed pursuant to a firm’s document retention policy, 
courts have discussed the policy’s “reasonableness.”32  In Stevenson v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co.,33 the court evaluated the reasonableness of 
the defendant’s document retention policy.34  That case was brought 
by a motorist and the estate of his deceased wife after a train oper-
ated by the defendant collided with the motorist’s car, injuring the 
motorist and killing his wife.35  The plaintiffs moved for sanctions 
against the railroad company for destroying discoverable dispatch 
tapes between the train crew and the dispatcher that would have 
 27 THE SEDONA CONF., THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION AND RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 80 
(Charles R. Ragan et al. eds., 2005). 
 28 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 172 (emphasis added). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See LEXISNEXIS, WHITE PAPER, ELEMENTS OF A GOOD DOCUMENT RETENTION 
POLICY 2 (2007), http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePap 
ers/ADI_WP_ElementsOfAGoodDocRetentionPolicy.pdf. 
 32 Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 204 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Ark. 2001), rev'd on 
other grounds, 354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 430. 
 35 See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1087 (E.D. Ark. 
2000). 
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probably led to other discoverable evidence.36  The defendant’s direc-
tor of dispatching practices and quality assurance testified that “the 
purpose of taping conversations between crew members and dis-
patchers is to monitor the job performance of dispatchers and to re-
solve any question about movement authority that might arise.”37  
The defendant’s policy required retaining tapes for ninety days be-
fore destroying them, sixty days longer than the Federal Railroad 
Administration’s reported national average.38  Given the defendant’s 
business purpose for retaining the tapes, the court held that the 
document retention policy was not unreasonable.39
Courts will project the analysis they use to evaluate a reasonable 
document retention policy onto a routine EIS, particularly because an 
EIS will often be a component of a company’s document retention 
policy, if not the policy itself.40  Consequently, when an EIS is scruti-
nized for “routineness” within the meaning of the rule, a party who 
cannot provide a business reason for how it chooses to operate its 
EIS—as the defendant did in Stevenson with regard to its document 
retention policy—will not gain the benefit of the rule.41  To be sure, 
the law does not require companies to save “every single scrap of pa-
per in [their] business[es],”42 and recognizes that “keep[ing] certain 
information from getting into the hands of others . . . [is] common in 
business.”43  However, parties that program their EIS to eliminate 
data on an accelerated basis solely for the purpose of avoiding dis-
covery during litigation would violate their common law duty to pre-
serve documents that may be subject to litigation.44
 36 Stevenson, 204 F.R.D. at 430. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. The court did note, however, that the reasonableness of a document reten-
tion policy does not relieve a defendant of the burden to preserve documents that 
the defendant knows, or should know, will become material at some point in the fu-
ture.  Id. 
 40 See Paul French, Electronic Document Retention Policies (and Why Your Clients Need 
Them), L. PRAC. TODAY (2004), http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr01045 
.html. 
 41 See Stevenson, 204 F.R.D. at 430. 
 42 Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 
2003).  See infra Part III.B.1.c.ii for a more detailed discussion of what a party’s obli-
gation to preserve entails. 
 43 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
 44 For a complete discussion of parties’ common law and other obligations to pre-
serve information, see infra Part III.B.1.c.ii. 
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C. Step 3: When Is a Party Operating in “Good Faith”? 
The “good faith” requirement of Rule 37(e) refers to how a 
party operated its EIS with regard to the specific information that had 
been lost.45  When Rule 37(e) was originally published for public 
comment in 2004, it adopted a negligence test rather than the cur-
rent “good faith” standard.46  In addition to the “negligence” version 
of the rule, an alternate “intentional or reckless” version was also 
proposed and was published as a footnote to the “negligence” ver-
sion.47  The Judicial Committee noted in its comments to the final 
version of the rule that the negligence standard offered “no mean-
ingful protection, but rather protected against conduct unlikely to be 
sanctioned in the first place.”48  However, the “intentional or reck-
less” version of the rule was considered too restrictive among those 
who contributed opinions during the public comment phase.  The 
commentators urged that this version of the rule would essentially in-
sulate conduct that should be subject to sanctions.49  The Judicial 
Committee noted that the final “good faith” version is an intermedi-
 45 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 169. 
 46 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., REPORT ON THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf.  
Rule 37(e), as proposed for public comment, stated: 
Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosure or Cooperate in Discovery; Sanc-
tions 
(f) Electronically Stored Information.  Unless a party violated an order 
in the action requiring it to preserve electronically stored information, 
a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on the party for 
failing to provide such information if: 
(1) the party took reasonable steps to preserve the information 
after it knew or should have known the information was discov-
erable in the action; and 
(2) the failure resulted from loss of the information because of 
the routine operation of the party’s electronic information sys-
tem. 
Id. 
 47 Id.  The “intentional or reckless” version of the Rule reads: 
(f) Electronically Stored Information.  A court may not impose sanc-
tions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically 
stored information deleted or lost as a result of the routine operation 
of the party’s electronic information system unless: 
(1) the party intentionally or recklessly failed to preserve the in-
formation; or 
(2) the party violated an order issued in the action requiring the 
preservation of the information. 
Id. 
 48 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 169. 
 49 Id. 
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ate culpability standard.50  The explicit rejection of a “negligence” 
standard in favor of a subjective standard implies that a party who 
loses information negligently may benefit from the safe harbor, so 
long as the party acted in good faith. 
Whereas the “routine” element of the rule focuses solely on the 
structure of the EIS, the “good faith” element is based on what the 
parties did once their obligations to preserve evidence were trig-
gered.  The committee notes on the rule emphasized the various ways 
in which a preservation obligation may arise, including obligations 
based in common law,51 statutes and regulations, agreements between 
the parties, and court orders.52  The committee notes go on to state 
that “[t]he good faith requirement of Rule 37[e] means that a party 
is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an information 
system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to 
continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is re-
quired to preserve.”53
Broccoli v. Echostar Communications Corp.54 illustrates the type of 
conduct that would not be protected by Rule 37(e).  In that case, a 
motion for sanctions was brought against defendant employer 
Echostar Communications Corporation (“Echostar”) for destroying e-
mails that would have been relevant to the Title VII sexual harass-
ment and retaliation claims brought against Echostar by the plain-
tiff.55  Echostar’s e-mail retention policy consisted of automatically 
transferring all of an employee’s sent e-mails after seven days to a “de-
leted items” folder, which in turn was purged fourteen days later.56  
Once purged, these e-mails were irretrievable.57  The court opined 
that this e-mail system, though “extraordinary” and “risky,” could 
have an arguably defensible business justification.58  However, since 
Echostar was on notice of potential litigation, it had an obligation to 
interfere with the automatic destruction of e-mails.59  The court 
stated: “Echostar clearly acted in bad faith in its failure to suspend its 
e-mail and data destruction policy or preserve essential personnel 
 50 Id. at 169–70. 
 51 See infra Part III.B.1.c.ii.1. 
 52 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 169. 
 53 Id. 
 54 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005). 
 55 Id. at 509. 
 56 Id. at 510. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 510–13. 
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documents in order to fulfill its duty to preserve the relevant docu-
mentation for purposes of potential litigation.”60
D. The Exception: What Constitutes an “Exceptional Circumstance”? 
Rule 37(e) will not apply if exceptional circumstances warrant 
the imposition of sanctions.61  This exception allows the party seeking 
sanctions to override the safe harbor if it can establish that the cir-
cumstances under which the information was lost necessitate sanc-
tions, even though the party responsible for the loss has satisfied the 
three elements of Rule 37(e).  The Judicial Committee does not out-
line the scope of an “exceptional circumstance” except to state that it 
is one in which “a court should provide remedies to protect an en-
tirely innocent party requesting discovery against serious prejudice 
arising from the loss of potentially important information.”62
Courts applying “exceptional” or “extraordinary” circumstance 
provisions in other contexts have ordinarily examined circumstantial 
evidence, such as patterns of behavior or badges of untruthfulness.  
For example, in Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co.,63 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision 
that—even though a party’s conduct did not amount to bad faith or 
an intent to defraud—the party’s general dishonesty amounted to an 
“exceptional” circumstance such that sanctions were appropriate.64  
In Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV,65 the court opined that 
“extraordinary circumstances” exist “where there is a pattern of dis-
regard for [c]ourt orders and deceptive litigation tactics that threaten 
 60 Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 512. 
 61 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 62 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 173. 
 63 601 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1979).
 64 Id. at 251–52. 
The district court suggested that the conduct of Campbell may not 
have amounted to bad faith or intent to defraud the Patent Office.  
However, the district court’s findings that Campbell was not the inven-
tor, that his testimony was unbelievable, and that he was aware of the 
facts surrounding the invention because of his relationship with Zim-
merman were more than ample to support a determination of bad 
faith on the part of Campbell for his inexplicable failure to respond 
truthfully to the request for admission, which had the effect of pro-
longing the litigation in this suit.  We agree with the district court that 
such conduct was sufficient to justify classifying the case as “excep-
tional” and awarding attorneys’ fees to Spectrum.  We find no abuse of 
discretion or misapplication of the law. 
Id.
 65 No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 WL 1837997 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004). 
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to interfere with the rightful decision of a case.”66  Both the Advanta-
care court and the Campbell court recognized that even when it ap-
pears that a party was justified in doing a particular act, facts gener-
ally related to the party’s conduct—such as patterns of behavior or 
badges of dishonesty—may evince an exceptional circumstance.  
Thus, in the context of Rule 37(e), if courts choose to apply the “ex-
ceptional circumstances” provision in the same way that the courts in 
Advantacare and Campbell did, then they withhold the benefit of the 
rule from parties which are found to repeatedly lose information, 
without the appearance of bad faith, or from parties that have a his-
tory of dishonesty. 
* * * 
Rule 37(e)’s three-step foundation, and its embedded exception, 
create a high hurdle for parties that wish to gain its protection.  If we 
were to visualize the prototypical candidate for Rule 37(e)’s applica-
tion—a relatively sophisticated corporate litigant that has been oper-
ating a sizeable EIS with a legitimate business purpose for some time, 
which finds itself embroiled in litigation, and in an effort to comply 
with a discovery request, inadvertently destroys a document—it is dif-
ficult to imagine why a court might find the corporate litigant’s good 
faith conduct worthy of punishment.  To borrow from the criminal 
law, the corporate litigant lacked the requisite mens rea to deserve 
punishment.  However, if under an exceptional circumstance it can 
be proven that the document was lost to the detriment of the corpo-
rate litigant’s adversary, then it would not be surprising if a court 
took action to remedy the evidentiary imbalance the loss created.  In 
sum, not only does Rule 37(e) appear to merely reflect our pre-
existing notions regarding sanctions, it distills the law regarding spo-
liation sanctions, rather than adding to it. 
III. SAFE HARBORS FOR SPOLIATION SANCTIONS: 
RULE 37(e) BY ANY OTHER NAME 
An examination of prior case law reveals that many courts would 
not have sanctioned parties for their good faith destruction of evi-
dence, reasoning that a party should not be punished for destroying 
evidence it did not intend to destroy.67  Further, those courts that 
 66 Id. at *5. 
 67 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that an order to pay an adversary’s attorneys’ fees is “fundamentally penal” 
thus requiring evidence of misconduct); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 
F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that bad faith destruction of evidence is 
predicate to an adverse instruction).  See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion about 
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have chosen to sanction parties for destroying evidence, even if de-
stroyed in good faith, did so not for punitive purposes, but rather eq-
uitable ones, with the intent to level the evidentiary playing field.68  
Hence, courts will continue this practice with regard to electronic in-
formation, basing their authority to do so on the “exceptional cir-
cumstances” provision of Rule 37(e). 
The law regarding spoliation of evidence is well developed.  
“Spoliation” has been defined as “the destruction or significant al-
teration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s 
use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”69  
The law’s reaction to the destruction of evidence has two purposes.  
One is to punish the improper conduct and the other is remedial, 
functioning to level the evidentiary playing field or “place the risk of 
an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created the 
risk.”70  Similar to a judge’s consideration of a criminal’s mens rea 
when issuing a punishment, in spoliation cases the court matches a 
party’s state of mind at the time the party destroyed the evidence with 
an appropriate sanction.71  Sanctions against spoliators include dis-
missal of a suit for egregious destruction of evidence72 and orders to 
pay the opposing party’s costs and fees for less flagrant intentional 
conduct.73
When the court is interested in leveling the evidentiary playing 
field, punishing the spoliator plays less of a role in determining which 
sanction to issue.  In those instances, the court is more concerned 
with the prejudice that was caused to the non-destroying party by the 
sanctions courts impose on parties that lose evidence and the requisite states of mind 
associated with each sanction. 
 68 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an adverse inference instruction is an “appropriate 
mechanism for restoring the evidentiary balance” caused by the loss of evidence—
even without a finding of “moral culpability”) (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit 
Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 69 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 70 Id.; see also Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 74 (“The concept of an adverse inference as a 
sanction for spoliation is based on two rationales.  The first is remedial . . . [and] 
[t]he second is punitive.”).  The sanctioning of improper conduct for punitive pur-
poses performs a dual role in that it might serve as a deterrent for future improper 
conduct.  See West, 167 F.3d at 779. 
 71 See DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-72265, 2005 
WL 3502172, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005). 
 72 Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, at *11 (N.D. 
Ill. May 8, 2006). 
 73 Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 512 (D. Md. 2005). 
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loss of the evidence.74  A common evidentiary sanction is the adverse 
inference instruction,75 which is sometimes called a “spoliation in-
struction.”76  An adverse inference instruction is an instruction to the 
jury that it may presume that the evidence that was destroyed would 
have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it.77  The adverse 
inference instruction is a classic sanction employed against the spolia-
tion of evidence “as illustrated by that favorite maxim of law, omnia 
presumuntur contra spoliaterum”78—all is presumed against the spolia-
tor. 
Under federal law, courts derive their power to sanction a party 
from two sources of authority.79  First, all courts are vested with an in-
herent “power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their 
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.”80  This power is 
not governed by statute, but rather is necessarily implied from the na-
ture of the institution.81  Consequently, these powers “cannot be dis-
pensed with in a [c]ourt, because they are necessary to the exercise of 
all others.”82  In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
held that the federal rules “are not substitutes for the inherent 
power[s].”83  The significance of this characteristic of the court’s in-
herent power is that Rule 37(e) does not disturb this authority. 
 74 See DaimlerChrysler, 2005 WL 3502172, at *1 (“A sanction may be appropriate 
‘regardless of whether the evidence is lost as the result of a deliberate act or simple 
negligence, [as] the other party is unfairly rejudiced . . . .’” (quoting Brenner v. Colk, 
573 N.W.2 65, 70 (Mich Ct. App. 1997))). 
 75 See Turner, 142 F.R.D. at  77. 
     In order to remedy the evidentiary imbalance created by the de-
struction of evidence, an adverse inference may be appropriate even in 
the absence of a showing that the spoliator acted in bad faith. However, 
where the destruction was negligent rather than willful, special caution 
must be exercised to ensure that the inference is commensurate with 
information that was reasonably likely to have been contained in the 
destroyed evidence. 
Id.
 76 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, 
at *5–6 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
 77 See Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 74. 
 78 Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470 (CSH), 2003 WL 1740606, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 
779 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 79 Under state law, parties can be held criminally liable and liable in tort for de-
struction of evidence.  Lawyers may also be held liable for destruction of evidence 
under ethics rules. 
 80 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 46. 
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Rule 37(e) does apply, however, to the court’s alternate source 
of authority to sanction spoliators: Rule 37.84  Rule 37 outlines both 
the procedures and the remedies for dealing with parties that do not 
cooperate in discovery.  Although nowhere in the rule is there any 
reference to loss or destruction of evidence, the rule is commonly 
used to impose sanctions for spoliation.85
There are four methods to obtain sanctions under Rule 37 for 
the loss of information.86  One method is through a combination of 
subsection (a) and (b)(2) of Rule 37: the non-violating party must 
move for an order to compel under 37(a) and then the court must 
rule that the order was violated under Rule 37(b)(2).87  The second 
method requires the court to rule that a previously standing court 
order was violated pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2).88  The third method, 
pursuant to Rule 37(c), requires a failure to comply with mandatory 
disclosures under Rule 26(a) and (e)(1).89  The final method re-
quires a failure of a party to serve a response to a request made under 
Rule 34.90
A. Rule 37(a): Motions to Compel and Sanctions 
Rule 37(a) allows parties to file a motion with the court seeking 
an order compelling an opposing party to produce documents.91  Par-
ties would typically employ this rule when they have sought discovery 
pursuant to Rule 34,92 but their adversary has refused to comply.  
Therefore, if a party suspects that an opposing party has destroyed or 
otherwise lost information, the party may first move for an order to 
 84 FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 85 See, e.g., Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *3 n.5 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 27, 2003). 
 86 FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 87 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)–(b). 
 88 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b).  The analysis under the second method will be co-
extensive with the first method, since the “order” requirement under this method 
can, but need not, originate from a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a). 
 89 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c). 
 90 FED. R. CIV. P.  37(d). 
 91 FED. R. CIV. P.  37(a) (“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a 
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.”). 
 92 FED. R. CIV. P. 34.  This rule allows parties to request documents, things, and 
entry upon land for inspection.  Id.  The rule does not require the intervention of 
the court for a request to be made.  Id.  If the party served with the document re-
quest objects to the request or any part thereof, then the requesting party may move 
for an order to compel disclosure under Rule 37(a).  Id. 
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compel pursuant to Rule 37(a).93  Although this subsection of the 
rule does not afford sanctions for the failure to produce the docu-
ments in question, it does allow the successful movant to seek sanc-
tions in the form of payment for “reasonable expenses incurred in 
making the motion, including attorney’s fees.”94
Rule 37(e) could theoretically shield litigants from paying the 
costs and fees associated with a Rule 37(a) motion.  For example, 
suppose Party X moves to compel Party Y to produce a document, 
and the court, accepting the motion, orders Party Y to comply.  In at-
tempting to comply, however, Party Y loses the information he was 
ordered to produce as a result of a good faith operation of a routine 
EIS.  Under Rule 37(e), Party Y will probably not have to pay the costs 
and fees associated with Party X’s motion to compel. 
However, Rule 37(a) already has a safe harbor provision of its 
own that shields Party Y just as effectively as, if not more than, Rule 
37(e)’s protections.95  Under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(ii), parties may es-
cape sanctions if they can prove that their nondisclosure was “sub-
stantially justified.”96  The Supreme Court has held that the standard 
for determining whether resistance to a motion to compel is “sub-
stantially justified” is rather low, requiring merely that there be a 
“genuine dispute” or that “reasonable people could differ as to [the 
appropriateness of the contested action],” as opposed to requiring a 
“high degree” of justification.97
Consequently, the protections provided by Rule 37(e) as to sanc-
tions under 37(a) are redundant.  A party seeking the protection of 
Rule 37(e) from Rule 37(a) sanctions would have to satisfy the rigid 
framework imposed by Rule 37(e).  By contrast, a party seeking pro-
tection using the “substantially justified” provision of Rule 37(a) 
would merely have to demonstrate that “reasonable people could dif-
fer” as to the propriety of the act which led to information being 
 93 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613, 
620–21 (N.D. Ill. 1981).  Plaintiff sought an order to compel pursuant to Rule 37(a) 
after suspecting that relevant documents had been destroyed.  Id. 
 94 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5). 
 95 See id. 37(a)(5)(A). 
 96 Id. (“If the motion [to compel] is granted . . . the court must . . . require the 
party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant’s reasonable 
expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees . . . [unless]  
the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially  
justified . . . .”). 
 97 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted). 
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lost98—arguably, a lower threshold than Rule 37(e)’s “good faith” re-
quirement. 
B. Rule 37(b)(2): Sanctions for Failing to Comply with an Order 
Rule 37(b)(2) has two parts.99  The first part, the “violation 
stage,” outlines the circumstances under which this rule is applicable.  
Essentially, the only element which exists at the violation stage is the 
violation of a court order.  Although at first blush this element ap-
pears unambiguous, a large body of case law interpreting this ele-
ment has developed since the promulgation of the rule, including a 
number of circuit splits.  Therefore, to fully understand how Rule 
37(e) will interact with Rule 37(b)(2), Part III.B.1, below, consists of 
a thorough delineation of how courts have interpreted the rule and 
what consequences these interpretations will have on how Rule 37(e) 
will be applied in those jurisdictions. 
The second part of Rule 37(b)(2), the “sanction stage,” lists the 
different types of sanctions that a court may choose to employ against 
a party that has been found to be in violation of a discovery order in 
the violation stage.  Courts have diverged on how to apply these sanc-
tions, therefore in Part III.B.2 these differences will be discussed and 
the consequences they will have on Rule 37(e)’s application will be 
explained. 
1. “The Violation Stage”: The Order Requirement 
Once an order to compel discovery is issued, whether it be a re-
sult of a motion made under Rule 37(a) or sua sponte, the failure to 
comply with that order can give rise to sanctions under Rule 
37(b)(2).100  This rule is used to sanction destruction of evidence 
when the loss results in a party’s inability to comply with a court or-
der.101  To be sure, under this rule the court is sanctioning the party 
for violating a court order and not specifically for destroying evi-
dence. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). 
 100 Id. (“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide . . . discovery, including an 
order under . . . 37(a),  the court . . . may issue further  just orders.”).  
 101 Note that Rule 37(a) provides the means for a party to make a motion for an 
order to compel an opponent to produce documents.  Besides ordering the non-
producing party to pay for the costs and fees associated with that motion, Rule 37(a) 
is not a source of authority for the court to sanction the underlying behavior which 
led the moving party to file the motion in the first place.  Rule 37(b), on the other 
hand, does address the underlying behavior because it authorizes the court to sanc-
tion a party for failing to comply with a court order. 
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The order requirement renders this rule a clumsy instrument to 
employ sanctions for spoliation.  Some courts hesitate to issue sanc-
tions for spoliation pursuant to the rule, noting that Rule 37(b)(2) 
does not specifically address evidence destruction, and prefer to em-
ploy their inherent powers.102  As noted above, the destruction of evi-
dence is a classic annoyance of the courts103 and has been frequently 
sanctioned pursuant to the courts’ inherent authority since long be-
fore the federal rules were promulgated.104
Since Rule 37(b)(2) is not tailor-made for addressing evidence 
spoliation, different jurisdictions justify their course of action based 
on their interpretation of Rule 37(b)(2).  For example, courts differ 
in their understanding of what constitutes a “court order.”105  Courts 
also differ over whether a party must demonstrate a particular state of 
mind or culpability level before they will be held liable for sanctions 
under the rule.106  Finally, courts differ over whether an order can be 
violated before the order is even issued.107  Since Rule 37(e), by defi-
nition, only applies to sanctions “under these rules,”108 how a court 
chooses to interpret Rule 37(b)(2) will have an effect on whether 
Rule 37(e) will be applicable. 
a. What Constitutes a “Court Order”? 
A typical scenario in which 37(b)(2) is used to sanction spolia-
tion involves a party’s destruction of evidence that was the subject of a 
preservation order or an order to produce discovery.  However, some 
courts are more willing than others to find the existence of an “or-
der” that was violated, which facilitates using 37(b)(2) for sanctioning 
evidence destruction.  For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit takes a generous position, acknowledging that a party 
could be found to be in violation of an order if they fail to produce 
documents by the date on which they promised to deliver them.109  In 
 102 Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470 (CSH), 2003 WL 1740606, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 103 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 104 See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d. Cir. 1999) (“It 
has long been the rule that spoliators should not benefit from their  
wrongdoing . . . .”). 
 105 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 115–47 and accompanying text. 
 108 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 109 Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 756 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Cammon, No. 88 C 5549, 1989 WL 153558, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1989)). 
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Brandt v. Vulcan,110 the court stated in dicta that it might consider an 
“agreement among the parties” as constituting an order.111  There-
fore, courts that are more likely to find that an order was violated are 
also more likely to use Rule 37(b)(2) to sanction that violation, and 
consequently, Rule 37(e) will play a larger role in those jurisdic-
tions.112  Stated differently, courts in jurisdictions that choose to apply 
a broad definition of “order” are more likely to find individual in-
stances of information loss that are sanctionable under Rule 
37(b)(2). 
b. Which State of Mind Is Required? 
Courts also differ on the state of mind required when a party vio-
lates the order.  Some courts require that the party display “willful-
ness, bad faith, or fault.”113  This approach, however, appears to be 
the minority since the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, held 
that neither willfulness nor good faith should be considered when a 
party violates a production order; willfulness and good faith are only 
considered when determining the appropriate sanction.114  Neverthe-
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 756. 
 112 Recall that according to the plain language of Rule 37(e) the Rule applies only 
to sanctions imposed under “these rules”—referring to the federal rules.  Therefore, 
in jurisdictions that are less likely to find that an order was violated and consequently 
will not apply Rule 37(b)(2), the court might seek alternate avenues for sanctioning 
the party—in which case Rule 37(e) will have no application. 
 113 Philips Med. Sys. Int’l v. Bruetman, 982 F.2d 211, 214 (7th Cir. 1992).  The 
holding in Philips Medical Systems may be a result of sloppy research: to support the 
court’s proposition that an order be violated with “willfulness, bad faith, or fault,” the 
court cites to Roland v. Salem Contract Carriers, Inc., 811 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1987), 
which holds that the sanction of dismissal can only be employed when there is evi-
dence of willfulness, bad faith, or fault.  Id. at 1179.  These cases are distinguishable 
because the Philips Medical Systems court considers state of mind when determining 
the propriety of sanctions, while the Roland court considers state of mind when deter-
mining the type of sanction to impose, presupposing that sanctions are appropriate. 
 114 Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).  The pre-1970 version of Rule 37(b) contained 
language which indicated that sanctions were appropriate only if a party refused to 
disclose evidence, rather than failed to do so.  Consequently, some courts interpreted 
this choice of language as indicating that for a party to refuse to obey a discovery or-
der required a degree of willfulness, while a failure to obey, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 
41(b), did not.  See Roth v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.C. 
Pa. 1948) (refusing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) because the party 
did not willfully violate a court order).  However, in 1958 the Supreme Court clari-
fied this ambiguity by declaring that “a party ‘refuses to obey’ simply by failing to 
comply with an order.”  Societé Internationale, 357 U.S. at 208.  Congress adopted Jus-
tice Harlan’s decision in Societé Internationale in its 1970 amendment to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, excising “refusal” and replacing it with “failure.” 
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less, in those jurisdictions that do require willfulness, bad faith, or 
fault, Rule 37(e) will be inapplicable since it protects only parties that 
lose information in good faith.  Thus, litigants charged with spolia-
tion would not be liable in these jurisdictions anyway.  For jurisdic-
tions that do not consider scienter at the violation stage of Rule 
37(b)(2), violations committed in good faith may be subject to sanc-
tions, in which case 37(e) might have some applicability at the sanc-
tions stage of Rule 37(b)(2). 
c. Does the Rule Encompass Pre-Order Violations? 
Courts are divided on the issue of whether to find that a party 
has violated an order if the information is lost prior to the issuance of the 
order.  The District of New Jersey has held that when documents are 
destroyed prior to an order to produce, no violation occurs because 
the party was unable to comply.115  Other jurisdictions summarily re-
fuse to use Rule 37(b)(2), a discovery rule, to sanction pre-litigation 
conduct and choose to employ their inherent powers to sanction the 
conduct instead.116
Some jurisdictions put a more lenient judicial gloss on the rule 
and indicate that a party which destroys information before a discov-
ery order is issued can in fact be subject to sanctions for violating that 
order.117  Although at first blush this interpretation of the rule ap-
pears counter-intuitive, if not metaphysical, the basis for its rationale 
is plausible.118  Courts that accept this approach to the rule, including 
 115 Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 765 (D.N.J. 1981). 
 116 See e.g., Beil v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“The court simply recognizes that Rule 37 is a procedural rule, and like all proce-
dural rules, it governs conduct during the pendency of a lawsuit.”); Capellupo v. 
FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 n.14 (D. Minn. 1989) (“Rule 37 does not, by its 
terms, address sanctions for destruction of evidence prior to the initiation of a law-
suit or discovery requests.”).
 117 See, e.g., Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (holding that sanctions are appropriate for pre-order destruction of evidence). 
 118 The approach is arguably supported by the Supreme Court in Societé Interna-
tionale, 357 U.S. at 207–08, in which the Court stated: 
Indeed subsection (b) [of Rule 37] . . . is itself entitled ‘Failure to 
Comply With Order.’  For purposes of subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 37, 
we think that a party ‘refuses to obey’ simply by failing to comply with 
an order.  So construed the Rule allows a court all the flexibility it 
might need in framing an order appropriate to a particular situation.  
Whatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the production 
order.  Such reasons, and the willfulness or good faith of petitioner, 
can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to 
the path which the District Court might follow in dealing with peti-
tioner’s failure to comply. 
Id. 
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the U.S. District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the 
Northern District of Illinois, indicate that if a party’s inability to com-
ply with a discovery order is self-inflicted, then that party should not 
elude sanctions for failing to obey the discovery order simply because 
they were unable to comply.119  The keystone to sanctions for pre-
order destruction under 37(b)(2) is the prerequisite that the violator 
had some prior duty to preserve besides the order itself.120  Notice of 
a pending litigation triggers that duty to preserve.121  Therefore, in 
the few jurisdictions that expand the reach of Rule 37(b)(2) sanc-
tions to pre-order, and sometimes pre-litigation, destruction of evi-
dence, the courts limit the expansion by also requiring that the party 
have a pre-existing duty to preserve that evidence.122
The implication of courts that employ the doctrine of pre-order 
spoliation of evidence is substantial and mirrors the effect caused by a 
broader interpretation of “court order.”123  In these jurisdictions, an 
act of spoliation is more likely to be sanctionable under Rule 37.  In 
turn, this broad application of Rule 37(b)(2) translates into greater 
numbers of spoliators that can avail themselves of Rule 37(e)’s safe 
harbor.124
 119 Id.; see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May, 25 1979, 90 
F.R.D. 613, 621 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding as inadequate a “self-serving” defense to the 
destruction of evidence which stated that documents were destroyed prior to the is-
suance of a preservation order and therefore were not subject to the order). 
 120 See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1976) 
(ordering sanctions against defendant for defendant’s failure to properly respond to 
interrogatories because relevant documents had been destroyed; the court held that 
even though documents were destroyed by defendants before the complaint was 
filed, the defendant was aware of the pendency of the suit, and therefore had a duty 
to preserve that evidence); Stubli v. Big D Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785, 787–88 
(Nev. 1991) (applying a rule practically identical to Rule 37(b)(2), held that plain-
tiffs’ pre-trial destruction of evidence warranted sanctions pursuant to the rule be-
cause plaintiffs knew the evidence would be relevant to a potential litigation). 
 121 Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005). 
 122 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 75 F.R.D. at 440 (holding that sanctions for 
destruction of evidence that occurred before suit was filed were appropriate because 
at the time of the destruction the spoliators had knowledge, obtained from paid in-
formants, that they would be sued). 
 123 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 124 This broad interpretation of how Rule 37(e) should be applied mirrors the 
broad interpretation some courts have of what constitutes an order.  See supra Part 
III.B.1.a.  In both situations, the effect of the court’s interpretation is to broaden the 
scope of acts that can be sanctioned using Rule 37(b)(2). 
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i. Pre-order 37(b)(2) Application and the Court’s 
Inherent Powers 
When courts allow Rule 37(b)(2) to reach back in time to pre-
order acts, they in effect try to reconcile their Rule 37(b)(2) analysis 
with an inherent powers analysis.125  Under the inherent powers ap-
proach, parties charged with notice of litigation have a duty to pre-
serve all information that may be relevant to that litigation.126  Simi-
larly, under the pre-order approach to Rule 37(b)(2), courts will find 
a violation of an order resulting from a party’s pre-order loss of in-
formation only where that party had notice that what it lost would be 
relevant to litigation in the future.127  Recall that on its face, Rule 
37(b)(2) applies in narrow circumstances where a court order is vio-
lated.  These courts, however, create a back door to the rule through 
which they can use the broad reach of the inherent powers analysis 
while simultaneously flying the flag of Rule 37(b)(2).  Thus, it be-
hooves litigants in jurisdictions that apply Rule 37(b)(2) to pre-order 
violations to understand their duty to preserve. 
ii. The Duty to Preserve: Triggering the Duty and the 
Scope of Preservation 
Two questions arise when courts analyze what evidence a party 
must preserve: (1) when does the duty to preserve arise, and (2) what 
should be the scope of the preservation?128  The duty to preserve 
arises “when the party is placed on notice that the evidence is rele-
vant to litigation or when the party should have known that the evi-
dence may be relevant to future litigation.”129  Certainly, a party is 
placed on notice of its duty to preserve information when the court 
explicitly orders that party to preserve a document or produce it to 
the adversary.130  However, as mentioned above, duties to preserve are 
 125 As a general matter, using principles of a court’s inherent power to sanction 
spoliation under the federal rules is not revolutionary; courts have indicated that the 
analysis under the two doctrines is similar.  Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 
22439865, at *3 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003).  Sometimes courts base their authority 
to sanction concurrently on both their inherent powers and Rule 37.  See Smith v. 
City of New York, 388 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 126 Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quot-
ing Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F.Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984)). 
 127 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) (citing 
Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 130 Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 73. 
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sometimes triggered without formal discovery requests.131  For exam-
ple, the filing of a complaint would inform the party of its duty.132
When a party has, or should have, reason to believe that he will 
be subject to litigation which may arise in the future, the duty to pre-
serve may be triggered before a complaint is filed.133  In some cases, 
the moment this pre-litigation duty is triggered is clear.  For example, 
if a party has actual knowledge that another party is poised to file a 
suit, the duty is triggered.134  Further, if a party intends to file suit, 
naturally it would be charged with notice of its own action and its 
duty to preserve would be triggered.135
In other instances, whether a pre-litigation duty to preserve has 
been triggered is more nebulous.  For example, a party that is re-
sponsible for the injury of another party may reasonably anticipate 
that it will be sued, in which case the duty to preserve will arise at the 
time of injury.136  Facts which are not directly related to an injury may 
refine a party’s notice of litigation that may arise in relation to that 
injury.  For example, if a party has been sued before on the basis of a 
similar injury in the past, then once that injury occurs again, the party 
should reasonably anticipate that it will be sued.137
Once the duty is triggered, the party charged with the duty must 
institute a litigation hold.138  A litigation hold covers those documents 
 131 Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8 (N.D. 
Ill. May 8, 2006). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 510. 
 134 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 135 See Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 765–66 (D.N.J. 
1981). 
 136 Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 204 F.R.D. 425, 430 (E.D. Ark. 2001) (noting 
that “[w]hen there is a death or serious injury in a collision, the Defendant knows 
within reason that a personal injury or death claim may be made”). 
 137 See Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 547 (D. Minn. 1989).  But see Con-
cord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4 (E.D. 
Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
[T]o hold that a corporation is under a duty to preserve all e-mail po-
tentially relevant to any future litigation would be tantamount to hold-
ing that the corporation must preserve all e-mail. . . . Any corporation 
the size of Defendant (or even much smaller) is going to be frequently 
involved in numerous types of litigation. . . . Arguably, most e-mails, ex-
cluding purely personal communications, could fall under the um-
brella of ‘relevant to potential future litigation.’ . . . [I]t would be nec-
essary for a corporation to basically maintain all of its e-mail.  Such a 
proposition is not justified. 
Id.
 138 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Once a 
party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document reten-
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which “are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or are rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”139  
This is an objective standard because it is based on what information 
a litigant reasonably calculates will lead to discovery, as opposed to 
what the litigant believes is relevant.140
The obligation to enact a litigation hold can appear to impose a 
Herculean task on parties anticipating, or embroiled in, litigation.  A 
party may face the difficult choice between interrupting the routine 
operation of its business and potentially exposing itself to sanctions in 
the future.141  Recognizing the predicament, some courts have pro-
vided some breathing room.  For instance, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois has instructed that a party “does not 
have to preserve every single scrap of paper in its business.”142  The 
court also stated that “[a] party does not have to go to ‘extraordinary 
measures’” to preserve all potential evidence.143  Judge Scheindlin of 
the Southern District of New York indicated in Zubulake v. UBS War-
burg LLC144 that a party does not need to preserve all its backup tapes, 
which are generally used for disaster recovery.145  In fact, the Supreme 
Court has held that document retention policies “which are created 
in part to keep certain information from getting into the hands of 
others . . . are common in business” and that “[i]t is, of course, not 
wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a 
valid document retention policy under ordinary circumstances.”146  
tion/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation 
of relevant documents.”).  A “litigation hold,” also known as a “legal hold,” is “a 
communication issued as a result of current or anticipated litigation, audit, govern-
ment investigation or other such matter that suspends the normal disposition or 
processing of records.”  THE SEDONA CONF., supra note 27, at 94. 
 139 Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984). 
 140 Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 
2003) (“A party cannot destroy documents based solely on its own version of the 
proper scope of the complaint.” (quoting Diersen v. Walker, No. 00 C 2437, 2003 WL 
21317276, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003))). 
 141 See THE SEDONA CONF., supra note 27, at 45 (“[i]n particular circumstances, 
implementing a legal hold may also require a change to the organization’s backup 
procedures for business continuation or disaster recovery”). 
 142 Wiginton, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4 (citing Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2000)). 
 143 Id. (citing China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co. v. Simone Metals Inc., No. 97 C 
2694, 1999 WL 966443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999)). 
 144 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 145 Id. at 217. 
 146 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
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However, that policy must be suspended when a litigation hold is put 
in place.147
The intricacies and vagaries of the duty to preserve discussed 
above, such as when the duty arises and what the duty encompasses, 
provide a fertile landscape for litigation.  Although strictly limiting 
Rule 37(b)(2) to post-order destruction of evidence may shorten the 
court’s reach to what otherwise may be sanctionable behavior, the 
limitation leads to less litigation when strictly enforced and fewer in-
stances in which Rule 37(e) will be available for parties that have lost 
information in good faith.  Conversely, in the jurisdictions in which 
courts have expanded Rule 37(b)(2) to pre-order destruction of evi-
dence, more parties will be able to make use of Rule 37(e). 
2. “Sanctions Stage” 
Once a court has ruled that sanctions are warranted, it must de-
termine which sanctions are appropriate.  Rule 37(b)(2) sets forth 
nine types of sanctions available for courts to levy against parties that 
violate discovery orders,148 eight of which may be imposed on parties 
in the context of lost information.149  The sanctions range in severity 
from paying the opposing party’s expenses to a dismissal or default 
judgment.150  As mentioned above, in issuing sanctions, the courts’ 
objectives are both punitive and remedial.151  District courts have 
“broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction” in cases in-
volving the non-production of evidence, and their decision can be 
overturned on appeal only if the reviewing court finds the lower 
court abused its discretion.152
The factors that some courts consider when determining which 
sanctions are appropriate include the spoliator’s degree of fault, the 
opposing party’s degree of prejudice, and the effectiveness of the 
sanction in deterring similar future conduct and in remedying the 
substantial unfairness caused to the opposing party.153  Some courts 
tend to focus more or less on a single factor.  For example, in the 
Fifth Circuit, courts focus on the intentional conduct of the spolia-
 147 Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005). 
 148 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
 149 Id.  Rule 37(b)(2)(B) relates to a party’s failure to produce another for exami-
nation under Rule 35(a). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 152 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 153 See, e.g., Getty Props. Corp. v. Raceway Petroleum, Inc., No. Civ.A.99-CV-
4395DMC, 2005 WL 1412134, at *2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2005). 
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tor.154  In the Sixth Circuit, courts look to state law when determining 
whether certain sanctions are proper.155  The Supreme Court has 
ruled, however, that the most severe sanction under Rule 37(b)(2), 
dismissal or default judgment, should never be imposed on a party 
when its noncompliance was due to “inability, and not to willfulness, 
bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.”156
As for the less severe sanctions, jurisdictions are divided over 
how and when they should be applied.  For example, an adverse in-
ference instruction requires intentional destruction in some jurisdic-
tions while not in others.157  In the District of Utah, a court has held 
that an adverse inference instruction, a sanction available under Rule 
37(b)(2)(A), “must be predicated on the bad faith of the party de-
stroying the records.”158  Some would argue that by definition, an ad-
verse inference can be imposed only against parties that destroy evi-
dence intentionally.  The rationale supporting that argument is that 
when a party intentionally destroys a document, it does so because 
the document would have been harmful to its case.159  Therefore, it 
follows logically that if a party destroys evidence negligently or in 
good faith, then there is no reason to believe that the destroyed evi-
dence would have been harmful to that party.  Consequently, in ju-
risdictions that follow the intent-based approach, parties that lose in-
formation in good faith will not be sanctioned with an adverse 
inference instruction.  In turn, Rule 37(e), which only protects good 
faith loss, would offer a safe harbor to parties that do not need it. 
 154 MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: 
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 271 (2d. 
ed. 2005). 
 155 Id. at 274. 
 156 Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958). 
 157 Compare Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998) 
(holding that bad faith destruction of evidence is predicate to an adverse inference 
instruction), with Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 
108 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an adverse inference instruction may be based on a 
showing of negligence rather than bad faith or gross negligence). 
 158 Procter & Gamble Co., 179 F.R.D. at 631 (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 
F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mathis v. 
John Morden Buick, Inc. 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a show-
ing of bad faith was necessary before an adverse inference instruction would be is-
sued). 
 159 Procter & Gamble Co., 179 F.R.D. at 631 (noting “mere negligence in losing or 
destroying a document does not support an inference that the party was conscious of 
a weakness in its case, the ‘adverse inference must be predicated on bad faith of the 
party destroying the records.’” (quoting Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1407)). 
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In other jurisdictions—instead of using an intent-based rationale 
for imposing an adverse inference instruction—courts focus more on 
the damage done to the party that did not destroy the documents.  
For example, in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp.,160 
the court explained: 
[The] sanction [of an adverse inference] should be available even 
for the negligent destruction of documents if that is necessary to 
further the remedial purpose of the inference.  It makes little dif-
ference to the party victimized by the destruction of evidence 
whether that act was done willfully or negligently. The adverse in-
ference provides the necessary mechanism for restoring the evi-
dentiary balance. The inference is adverse to the destroyer not 
because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the risk 
that the evidence would have been detrimental rather than favor-
able should fall on the party responsible for the loss.161
In jurisdictions that follow the evidentiary-based approach, therefore, 
courts are more willing, under certain circumstances, to impose ad-
verse inference instructions against parties that destroy evidence neg-
ligently.162  In fact, in Societé Internationale the Supreme Court stated in 
dicta that a party which fails to comply with an order “due to inability, 
and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of [its own] . . . will 
[not] profit through its inability to tender the records called for.”163  
The Court went on to say that “[i]t may be that in the absence of 
complete disclosure by petitioner, [a court] would be justified in 
drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular 
events.”164
When intentional destruction is lacking, courts typically require 
the party seeking the adverse inference to establish, using “extrinsic 
evidence of content,” that the lost information was prejudicial to the 
spoliator.165  Proving that destroyed evidence was prejudicial to the 
party that destroyed it can be difficult since, of course, the party with 
the burden of proof might not know exactly what was destroyed.  
Therefore, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
 160 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 161 Id. at 108 (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 162 See Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 219 
(1st Cir. 1982) (holding that an adverse inference was an appropriate sanction 
against a party that had not destroyed evidence in bad faith and  considered, among 
other factors, the issue of fairness to the opposing party). 
 163 Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958). 
 164 Id. at 213. 
 165 Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 77. 
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York has opined that parties burdened with establishing prejudice 
should not be held to “‘too strict a standard of proof regarding the 
likely contents of the destroyed evidence.’”166  In New York National 
Organization for Women v. Cuomo,167 however, the Southern District of 
New York recognized that too lax a standard of proof would be prob-
lematic as well because spoliators are not supposed to be punished 
merely for depriving their adversary of “a pond in which they would 
like to have gone on a fishing expedition.”168
In the jurisdictions that regard the adverse inference instruction 
as a measure to remedy the evidentiary imbalance caused by the loss 
of information, and therefore are not as concerned that the party 
committed the act in bad faith, it would appear that Rule 37(e) could 
play a meaningful role in protecting parties that have lost informa-
tion in good faith.  However, application of the Rule 37(e) safe har-
bor in these instances may pose a dilemma for these courts.  They will 
be confronted with a situation in which evidence has been lost in 
good faith, but the opposing party has succeeded to some extent in 
demonstrating that the lost evidence was prejudicial to the spoliator’s 
case, thus tipping the evidentiary scales in the spoliator’s favor.169  It is 
plausible that under these circumstances, a judge that follows this ra-
tionale toward spoliation sanctions will find that “exceptional circum-
stances” exist such that a jury should be instructed on the adverse in-
ference despite the spoliator’s satisfaction of the elements of Rule 
37(e).  This application of the “exceptional circumstances” doctrine 
is consistent with past applications of the doctrine, where courts have 
held that exceptional circumstances may lead a court to take a course 
different from what is expected of it because the totality of the cir-
cumstances demand the court to do so.170
Besides dismissal or default judgment and adverse inference in-
structions, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a court to order the offending 
party to pay any of its adversary’s costs and fees that were caused by 
 166 Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470 (CSH), 2003 WL 1740606, at 
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d 
Cir. 1998)). 
 167 No. 93 Civ. 7146 (RLC) JCF, 1998 WL 395320 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998). 
 168 Id. at *3. 
 169 Note also, however, that if the opposing party fails to establish that the lost in-
formation would have been prejudicial to the party that lost it, then the court will not 
be convinced that the evidentiary balance has been disturbed and will thus refrain 
from instructing the jury on an adverse inference.  Therefore, Rule 37(e) would be 
unnecessary in that case as well. 
 170 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
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the failure to comply.171  However, just as in Rule 37(a), the costs and 
fees provision of Rule 37(b)(2) disallows the award if the violating 
party can establish that its failure was substantially justified.172  There-
fore, as with Rule 37(a), the “substantially justified” provision func-
tions as a “safe harbor” for parties whose failure to comply is in good 
faith. Clearly, then, Rule 37(e) would not be of any use to parties that 
wish to avoid paying costs and fees because the rule already contains 
an instrument to protect such parties.  Further, some courts have 
held that, as a general rule, ordering a party to pay its adversary’s at-
torneys’ fees is a “fundamentally penal” sanction such that there must 
be “clear and convincing evidence of the predicate misconduct.”173  
In those courts, since good faith destruction would not be penalized, 
Rule 37(e) would have no function. 
C. Rule 37(c): Sanctions for Failing to Disclose 
Rule 37(c)(1) gives courts the authority to sanction parties that 
fail to make disclosures which are required by Rule 26(a) or 
26(e)(1).174  Rule 26(a) outlines three instances when parties to a liti-
gation must provide certain disclosures to all the other parties.175  
These instances include initial disclosures, disclosures of expert tes-
timony, and pretrial disclosures.176  The disclosures are mandatory, 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the 
disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both, to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, 
unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 174 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required 
by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or 
witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, 
unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.  In addition 
to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an 
opportunity to be heard: (A) may order payment of the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure; (B) may inform 
the jury of the party's failure; and (C) may impose other appropriate 
sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-
(vi). 
Id. 
 175 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)–(3). 
 176 Id. 
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meaning that they must be provided even without having been re-
quested.177
If a party fails to make a mandatory disclosure pursuant to Rule 
26(a) or 26(e)(1), then Rule 37(c)(1) imposes an automatic preclu-
sion sanction.178  This means that a party that fails to disclose informa-
tion is automatically forbidden from using that information at a trial, 
hearing, or motion.179  Since it may be to the responding party’s bene-
fit to withhold the information, when a party’s failure to disclose is 
due to the loss of information, the preclusion sanction is ineffective.  
In those cases, the rule provides for alternate sanctions, such as pay-
ing attorneys’ fees or issuing an adverse inference instruction.180  The 
Advisory Committee Notes to this rule specifically state that when a 
failure to disclose results from spoliation of evidence, the alternate 
sanctions should be used.181
The alternate sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) are not self-
executing, but rather are imposed after the party seeking the sanc-
tion files a motion and the party against whom sanctions are sought is 
given an opportunity to be heard on the issue.182 The alternate sanc-
tions are the same as the ones listed in Rule 37(b)(2), which include 
adverse inference instructions and payment of costs and fees.183
A unique feature of Rule 37(c)(1) that distinguishes it from Rule 
37(b)(2) is that parties will only be found in violation if they do not 
have a “substantial justification” for their failure.184  Recall that under 
Rule 37(b)(2), a party that violates a court order is considered to 
have failed to comply with the order, “whatever its reasons” are for 
not complying, and that “willfulness[,] or good faith . . . can hardly 
affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to the path 
 177 Id. 
 178 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
 179 Id. 
 180 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 181 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1993 amends., subdivision (c). 
Preclusion of evidence is not an effective incentive to compel disclo-
sure of information that, being supportive of the position of the oppos-
ing party, might advantageously be concealed by the disclosing party.  
However, the rule provides the court with a wide range of other sanc-
tions— . . . like [in the case of] spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury 
to be informed of the fact of nondisclosure—that, though not self-
executing, can be imposed when found to be warranted after a hear-
ing. 
Id. 
 182 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
 183 Id.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 184 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
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which the District Court might follow in dealing with petitioner’s 
failure to comply.”185  In contrast, Rule 37(c)(1) directs a court to 
consider at the outset any justifications a violating party might have 
for failing to disclose.186
“[W]hether a party’s failure to disclose was substantially justified 
is a fact question to be decided on the totality of the circumstances.  
In making this determination, the court considers all relevant factors, 
including:” (1) good faith, (2) willfulness or negligence, (3) control, 
and (4) surprise.187  Therefore, the “substantial justification” provi-
sion functions as a “safe harbor” for parties that have failed to make a 
disclosure despite attempting to comply with the rule.188  The Advi-
sory Committee Notes to the rule indicate that this provision is in-
cluded in the rule “to avoid unduly harsh penalties” which may be as-
sociated with the mandatory nature of disclosures under Rule 
26(a).189  Just as in Rule 37(a) and the costs and fees provision to Rule 
37(b)(2), the existence of a “substantially justified” provision obliter-
ates the use of Rule 37(e).  Any conduct that would be protected un-
der Rule 37(e) would also have been protected by the “substantially 
justified” provision of Rule 37(c). 
D. Rule 37(d): Sanctions for Failing to Respond 
Rule 37(d) is the final vehicle under Rule 37 that a party could 
use to seek sanctions against an adversary for failing to provide lost 
information.  The rule provides, in relevant part, for sanctions against 
parties that fail to answer or object to interrogatories submitted by a 
party and parties that fail to serve written responses to requests for in-
spection.190  If a party’s loss of information renders it unable to an-
 185 Societé Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958). 
 186 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). 
 187 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 595–96 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 188 See Hinton v. Patnaude, 162 F.R.D. 435, 439 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that 
plaintiff did not violate the Rule despite untimely disclosure because plaintiff’s con-
duct exhibited no “bad faith” or “callous disregard” and plaintiff “made efforts to 
conform with the Rules”). 
 189 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1993 amends., subdivision (c); 
Hinton, 162 F.R.D. at 439 (“[The substantial justification provision] was meant to sof-
ten the impact with respect to initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) . . . .”). 
 190 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d). 
The court where the action is pending may, on motion, order sanctions 
if: (i) a party . . . fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear 
for that person’s deposition; or (ii) a party, after being properly served 
with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under 
Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response. . . . 
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swer an interrogatory or respond to a request, then that failure could 
lead to sanctions.191  As a threshold matter, a litigant must learn what 
constitutes a failure to respond in the jurisdiction in which that party 
seeks to apply Rule 37(d).  Generally, partial answers are not sanc-
tionable because parties may move to compel additional answers un-
der Rule 37(a).192  However, courts have held that “a response that in 
substance disclaims responsiveness is sanctionable.”193
Rule 37(d) is similar to Rule 37(b)(2) in that a prima facie show-
ing of a failure to respond is all that is necessary before a court begins 
to consider which sanction is appropriate.194  The Advisory Commit-
tee Notes to the 1970 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure state that willfulness and other factors play a role in Rule 
37(d), but only in the choice of sanctions.195  The notes go on to 
state:  
[I]n view of the possibility of light sanctions, even a negligent 
failure should come within Rule 37(d).  If default is caused by 
counsel’s ignorance of Federal practice, or by his preoccupation 
with another aspect of the case, dismissal of the action and default 
judgment are not justified, but the imposition of expenses and 
fees may well be.196
It is plausible that Rule 37(e) will provide some protection to 
parties that have exposed themselves to sanctions for failing to re-
spond to a document request because they have lost information that 
would have enabled them to respond.  However, as mentioned above, 
in most jurisdictions a party can avoid being sanctioned for failing to 
respond by simply giving a partial answer.  The requesting party can 
then seek an order to compel under Rule 37(a), which returns us to 
the analysis of Rules 37(a) and 37(b)(2), above.  In jurisdictions in 
Sanctions may include any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-
(iv).  Instead or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require 
the party failing to act, the attorney advising the party, or both to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the fail-
ure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances 
make an award unjust. 
Id. 
 191 See Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 17 (D. 
Neb. 1985) (where plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Rule 37(d) seeking sanctions 
for defendant’s failure to respond to document requests submitted under Rule 34 as 
a result of their destruction of certain documents). 
 192 JOSEPH, supra note 187, at 591. 
 193 Id. 
 194 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1970 amends., subdivision (d). 
 195 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 196 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, 1970 amends., subdivision (d). 
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which a court will not accept a partial answer and will go forward with 
sanctions, the types of sanctions that Rule 37(d) proposes are the 
same as those in Rule 37(b)(2).  As discussed above, rarely are any 
significant sanctions imposed on parties that have failed to comply 
with their discovery obligations in good faith. 
E. Sources of Authority to Sanction Other than Rule 37 
Other areas of the law also demonstrate the justice system’s re-
luctance to reprimand a party that has lost evidence in good faith.  In 
jurisdictions that recognize the tort of spoliation, only a small fraction 
acknowledge liability when evidence is lost negligently, and in those 
cases there must be a further showing that the party prosecuting the 
tort claim was impaired in its ability to prove its case in a prior suit.197  
Further, much of the criminal law with respect to the destruction of 
evidence requires that the evidence be destroyed intentionally.  Fi-
nally, ethics rules appear to hold a lawyer accountable for the loss of 
evidence only when his or her involvement in the loss amounted to 
bad faith conduct. 
1. Tort Liability 
Some state courts recognize an independent cause of action 
against a party that has destroyed evidence.198 However, “only a mi-
nority of state high courts have recognized [the] independent tort 
claim.”199  States that have recognized the claim are further divided 
between those that recognize claims for intentional spoliation and 
those that also recognize claims for negligent spoliation.200  There is 
general agreement that the elements of intentional spoliation consist 
of: “(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff; (2) 
knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is prob-
able; (3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to dis-
rupt the plaintiff’s case; (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s case; and (5) 
damages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts.”201  Since inten-
tional spoliation requires intent on behalf of the spoliator to disrupt 
 197 This is similar to jurisdictions that issue an adverse inference instruction as a 
sanction for good faith loss of information, but only when there can be an inde-
pendent showing that the lost evidence would have been harmful to the party that 
lost it.  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. As had been postulated above, 
such a scenario would elicit the “exceptional circumstances” provision of Rule 
37(e)’s safe harbor.  See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 198 See KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 154, at 81. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 82. 
 201 Id. at 88. 
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the plaintiff’s case, it can be inferred that in these jurisdictions, if evi-
dence is lost in good faith—for example, without intent to disrupt the 
opponent’s case—the court would not find the spoliator tortiously li-
able for the destruction.  This approach to tortious liability mirrors 
the approach taken by courts which emphasize the punitive purposes 
of sanctions for spoliation of evidence because in both cases the court 
is focused on the intent of the destroying party to destroy the evi-
dence.  If evidence is lost in good faith, neither liability nor sanctions 
are imposed. 
As for the jurisdictions that recognize liability for negligent de-
struction of evidence, which consist of only four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia,202 the tort requires: 
(1) existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual 
duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the potential civil 
action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impair-
ment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship 
between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the 
lawsuit; and (6) damages.203
In these jurisdictions, although a party may be held liable for negli-
gently destroying evidence, even if it was acting in good faith, the op-
ponent must still establish that the destruction of the evidence actu-
ally occurred.  This approach mirrors the approach taken by courts 
that focus on the evidentiary imbalance that is created when evidence 
is lost, even when lost in good faith.  Here, as in the sanction context, 
besides a finding that the evidence was actually lost, the court also re-
quires the additional element that the lost evidence caused the op-
ponent an inability to prove their case.  As postulated in Part II.D., 
courts applying Rule 37(e) in jurisdictions such as those focusing on 
the evidentiary imbalance caused by spoliation will likely find that 
evidence which tends to prove that the lost information impaired an 
opponent’s case is an “exceptional circumstance” that requires a 
sanction and militates against employing the safe-harbor protections 
of Rule 37(e). 
2. Criminal Liability 
There are many sources of criminal liability for destruction of 
evidence at the federal level.204  Generally, these statutes require that 
 202 Id. at 89 (“Only Alabama, Montana, Indiana, some Pennsylvania courts and the 
District of Columbia presently recognize this tort.”). 
 203 Id. at 89. 
 204 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000) (prohibiting obstruction of justice); § 1505 
(Supp. V 2005) (governing obstruction of agency and congressional proceedings); § 
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the evidence be destroyed with intent.  For example, § 802 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, promulgated in the aftermath of the Enron 
and Worldcom scandals, attributes criminal liability to anyone that 
knowingly destroys documents “with the intent to impede . . . the in-
vestigation . . . within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of 
the United States” and provides that violators “shall be fined . . . [or] 
imprisoned . . . or both.”205
Further, Sarbanes-Oxley requires accountants to “retain corpo-
rate ‘audit or review work papers for a period of 5 years’” and makes 
it a crime to “knowingly and willfully violate” that requirement.206  
Some argue that “it seems unlikely that prosecutors will use such re-
sources to pursue ‘negligent or sloppy recordkeeping’ absent other 
criminal conduct.”207
3. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Lawyers’ ethical duties forbid them from destroying docu-
ments.208  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicate 
that a lawyer “shall not . . . unlawfully . . . destroy . . . a document or 
other material having potential evidentiary value.”209  Although the 
rule itself does not propound a culpability level, the comments to the 
rule state that the “[a]pplicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an 
offense to destroy material for purpose[s] of impairing its availability 
in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be fore-
seen.”210  It can be inferred that since the destruction has to be for 
the purpose of impairing its availability, then a lawyer’s loss of infor-
mation in good faith probably does not rise to the level of culpability 
required for a lawyer to be in violation of this rule.  Further, when a 
lawyer has an obligation pursuant to a tribunal to preserve or other-
wise produce evidence, the rule explicitly requires that a lawyer dis-
obey that obligation “knowingly” before she may be held accountable 
for the loss, thus exposing herself to disciplinary action.211
* * * 
1512 (Supp. V 2005) (governing witness tampering); and § 2071 (2000) (criminaliz-
ing willful destruction of records filed or deposited with federal courts or public of-
fices, or by one having custody of such records). 
 205 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. V 2005). 
 206 KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 154, at 111. 
 207 Id. at 112. 
 208 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118. 
 209 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a). 
 210 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) cmt. 2. 
 211 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c). 
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Regardless of how a court chooses to address spoliation, sanc-
tions are rarely imposed on parties that lose evidence in good faith—
precisely the only parties that can benefit from Rule 37(e)’s safe har-
bor.  In those few instances where courts do decide to issue sanctions 
when evidence is lost in good faith, they do so after a minimum show-
ing is made that the lost evidence would be beneficial to the non-
spoliating party.  It may be difficult for that party to meet such a bur-
den, since it can be impossible to know the content of the document 
which is now lost.  Rule 37(e)’s safe harbor may be of use in those 
cases, but if the non-spoliating party succeeds in proving that the evi-
dence was prejudicial, the court may consider the “exceptional cir-
cumstances” exception satisfied.  In light of the “safe harbors” that 
pre-date Rule 37(e), and which are still in force, it is doubtful that 
Rule 37(e) will have much of an impact on how courts issue sanctions 
in the context of inadvertent electronic spoliation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although electronic information is inherently different from 
non-electronic sources of evidence, this difference does not disturb 
the principles on which the law of sanctions for evidence spoliation is 
based—punishing bad faith conduct and remedying evidentiary im-
balances.  These principles are the ultimate arbiters of whether a 
party’s conduct requires the court to intervene, and the Judicial 
Committee acknowledged them as such by including Rule 37(e)’s 
“good faith” requirement and its “exceptional circumstances” provi-
sion.  In the final analysis, Rule 37(e) will be most effectively used as a 
quick-reference for how courts have always treated the types of evi-
dence loss covered by Rule 37(e). 
 
